Worlds apart?
Persisting ties Maybe so. Personally, I find the lack of contact accidental, and the apparent distance magnified through ignorance. I see meeting-points all through the recent decades. For instance, the account of common knowledge in Convention (Lewis 1969) was an important contributions to epistemic logic, even though he did not formalize the notion -a task undertaken only by the computer scientists.
Likewise, Situations and Attitudes (Barwise & Perry 1983) , though critical of epistemic logic, eventually resorts to Hintikka-like modeling in terms of ranges of relevant situations, to get their account straight of attitude reports involving epistemic "seeing that". And the well-known monograph Knowledge and its Limits (Williamson 2000) , though not a treatise on epistemic logic per se, definitely raises many logical issues concerning the valid laws of epistemic reasoning.
Indeed, it seems to me that many ongoing philosophical discussions about knowledge still show clear cultural influences from epistemic logic. It was there that issues of positive and negative introspection came to the fore in pregnant forms:
Is ¬K i¨© K i ¬K i¨ valid?
Epistemic logic would say that positions here depend on an analysis of the sort of 'access' that agents have to their range of indistinguishable alternatives. These can be either immediate, via transitive accessibility relations or even equivalence relations partitioning the logical space, or only in stages, in which case neither introspection principle holds. Likewise, the Distribution axiom validated by our modal semantics:
high-lighted, and I even suspect: engendered, the debate about logical omniscience.
Is our knowledge closed under implications which we know to follow? Or at least, is our knowledge closed under its own logical consequences? Of course, the exact wording may change here, and many contemporary epistemologists are concerned with this logical schema in a very different guise, viz. the Sceptical Argument:
I know that I have two hands I know that, if I have two hands, I am not a brain in a vat.

Therefore (?): I know that I am not a brain in a vat.
Also, their solutions to this particular problem need not be those of the logicians or computer scientists who have worried about omniscience. But see Section 2 below for a connection between logicians' attitudes and the contextualist way-out, which would claim that all three knowledge operators involved here come with their own contexts of use, depending on the norms that we apply for 'knowledge' in each case. And such connections are enough as a basis for discussion. Indeed, every time I meet with epistemologists, concerns seem congenial to me, even though there is more to epistemology than just logic -and more to logic than epistemology. The rest of this paper is a brief discussion of issues of shared concern which arise when the agendas are put side by side. In the course of these issues, a more general view of knowledge emerges inspired by modern developments in logic, which I formulate at the end.
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What is knowledge? delineates a genuine notion of wide range and appeal, well worth our attention.
We will return to this issue of unity in diversity toward the end of this paper. For the moment, we engage in a number of explorations, broadening the various interfaces with logic -'epistemic' or not -briefly touched upon so far.
Clusters of epistemic attitudes, and epistemic actions
Knowledge and its neighbors The preceding definitions involve clusters of topics that have been studied in logic over the last decades, such as knowledge, belief, conditionals, and belief revision. Modern logics in computer science even deal with the 'Belief-Desire-Intention' framework of agency (Wooldridge 2002) , where actions can only be explained through bringing together these various aspects in one system.
On the general epistemological side, there is an issue then of the appropriate cluster of notions to be studied. Different definitions of knowledge bring together topics that may cross standard boundaries within philosophy. E.g., on Plato's and Hintikka's account, knowledge also involves belief, and the neglected historical gem Lenzen 1980 turned this into a rich and highly original study of a much richer cluster of attitudes, including being 'convinced', considering propositions 'probable', and yet others. Or, on
Nozick's account, we must deal with counterfactual conditionals, traditionally more of a topic in logic and the philosophy of science. During the 1980s and 1990s, it has become clear in logic and AI that conditionals are linked intimately with belief revision, and hence the 'epistemic cluster' even grows to include various cognitive actions.
But also independently, it seems obvious that we should study many epistemic concepts in combination. If knowledge is something like a gold standard, we only understand it by also analyzing less solid currencies, such as belief or 'understanding'
-just as we learn vital facts about potential partners by taking a good look at their siblings and parents. Moreover, common parlance seems relevant. We would only say that someone 'knows' P if that person displays further expert behavior having to do with P. She should have learnt P on the basis of reliable procedures, but she should also be able to repeat the trick: be able to learn other things related to P, and very importantly, she should be able to communicate her knowledge to others. Whether this should go into the definition of knowledge may be debated (see Section 5 below), but all these features definitely form a natural agenda of things that belong together.
Logic combinations This pluralist view also reflects major trends in of modern logical research. Traditional philosophical logic was splintered in sometimes ridiculous ways, with subfields called 'modal', 'temporal', or even 'epistemic', 'doxastic', 'erotetic' or 'deontic' logic -the unfortunate result, one fears, of a desire to show off one's classical education. This led to niche formation which has been harmful to philosophical logic by and large. But the reality to-day is combination of logics, since about every meaningful task to be analyzed involves many of these things at once.
Consider the simplest conversation about any topic. We cannot make sense of it logically unless we describe what people know, believe, desire, say, or do.
And if there is something which we as logicians can contribute to the philosophical discussion of the 'epistemic cluster' in its entirety, it is the growing awareness that combinations are not just a matter of putting ingredients together. In particular, the mathematical complexity of combined systems may remain simple, but it may also explode, depending in subtle ways on the manner of combination. 
Adding proof terms to the language, it really is the more informative statement that
( , where # is some appropriate sum operation on proofs, or pieces of evidence generally. This idea has been developed in a sophisticated manner in the 'modal logic of proofs' of Artemov 1994 Artemov , 2005 , which also includes operations of 'choice' and 'checking' on proofs. Notice that this same approach also makes sense in our earlier discussion of the contextualist view of knowledge. In that case the crucial law is
with # now an operation of context merge yet to be defined in precise logical terms.
And so, we are back where we were: we know what to do, but it still needs to be done!
In the following section, we turn to some developments that have already happened.
Logical dynamics: bring in the actions!
Much of epistemology has been concerned with what it means to possess knowledge, as a sort of 24-carat information that is available to us in reliable ways. Sophisticated accounts of such intuitions about quality are the backbone of the field. By contrast, much recent work in epistemic logic has concentrated on dynamic mechanisms that produce or modify knowledge and related epistemic attitudes like belief -such as speech acts, communication, observation, learning, or even more radical belief revision.
This action-oriented trend shows an influence from computer science. For, one of the most powerful ideas in that field is the Tandem View:
representations and processes must always be studied together.
You cannot understand a process without thinking about the right data structures for it to work on, and you cannot design good data structures without having some process in mind that is going to use them. In logic since the 1980s, this insight has led to new theories of processes as first-class citizens such as information update, belief revision, natural language interpretation, and many others (Gärdenfors 1987 , Kamp & Reyle 1993 , Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 , Veltman 1996 , van Benthem, Muskens & Visser 1997 give a few examples of the viability of this style of thinking allied to epistemic logicwhich therefore still serves a 'laboratory' for inventing and elaborating new ideas.
Questions and answers in epistemic logic
Question-answer scenarios are among the most elementary actions in communicating knowledge. I ask you if P is the case, and you answer truly: "Yes". In normal Gricean circumstances, my question will tell you that I do not know if P, while I consider it possible that you do know. This would be the case, e.g., in the simple situation pictured by the following epistemic model, where the line between the two alternative worlds indicates my uncertainty:
Since you have no uncertainty lines in either world, you know whether P throughout, and I actually know that you know, as it is true in both of my alternatives. Now, your answer to my question changes this model, ruling out the ¬P-world. In modern jargon, an update takes place to the single-world model P where both you and I know that P, and we know this about each others, and so on:
P has become common knowledge between the two of us. Standard epistemic logic can describe the various knowledge assertions involved in the separate stages of this process, including interactive ones concerning knowledge about others. Before the question was asked, in the initial model, the following assertions were true, expressing the two mentioned preconditions for asking a cooperative question:
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A ¬P@ After the update with P, the following assertions have become true:
.e., iterated mutual knowledge, and even common knowledge C {Q, A} P in the group {Q, A}.
But this account of the question-answer episode still does not deal with the epistemic actions per se. For that, we borrow an idea from computer science, viz. the dynamic logic of programs and actions in general . 
Dynamic epistemic logic
[A!]K i C E D A F K i G A!]C
Does public announcement of A always lead to common knowledge of A?
In terms of our dynamic-epistemic logic, the following axiom would then be valid:
If nothing else, this at least enriches the set of typographical logical forms that epistemologists could argue about. Though intuitively plausible at first sight, this principle of epistemic action founders on Moore-type statements. Consider this case:
This may well be true now, but once uttered, it makes you know that P, and indeed, P becomes common knowledge, thereby invalidating ¬K you P & P as a whole. It is not known yet precisely which forms of assertion produce common knowledge -an open problem known among dynamic-epistemic logicians as the 'Learning Problem'. Selfrefuting assertions of the Moore type occur frequently to good effect in knowledge puzzles and games (van Benthem 2002B), so the example is no philosopher's fluke.
Verificationism and learnability
The way back from technical developments in modern epistemic logic to issues in mainstream epistemology can be quite short.
The following illustration is taken from van Benthem 2004B. Consider the simple but exasperating Fitch Paradox concerning the Dummett-style
Verificationist Thesis
What is true can be known, or in epistemic terms, plus some unspecified modality for the "can":
Fitch gave the following simple argument showing that the Verificationist Thesis is inconsistent. The heart of the problem is again a Moore-style assertion:
Therefore, we may conclude that P P KP, i.e., knowledge and truth collapse! There is a booming literature on solving this paradox, but one obvious link is with epistemic actions. The Verificationist Thesis claims that we can come to know every true assertion -presumably by some epistemic action, hidden under the existential quantifier of the "can". Consider the simplest actions possible, viz. public announcements. Perhaps God will reveal all to us. Then, our earlier dynamic-epistemic observation about announcements invalidating themselves applies. The principle
What is true can be learnt through announcement
is false in general. But the technical logical problem of finding out which assertions do produce their own common knowledge now translates into the perfectly respectable philosophical question just which versions of Verificationism are tenable.
More logical dynamics Public announcements are just the tip of an epistemic iceberg. Other relevant actions include partial observation, hiding of information, or coded communication, all the way to the most sophisticated epistemic abilities such as lying and cheating. Moreover, these actions do not just concern knowledge, but also belief, and belief revision (Gärdenfors & Rott 1995 , Spohn 1988 , Aucher 2003 Stalnaker 1999) . This might also lead to the incorporation of stategies and plans as first-class logical citizens, taking logical dynamics to its next natural interactive phase. All this is beyond our story here, however. Instead we just make a few comments about two further relevant aspects of logical dynamics.
From single updates to learning The term 'learning' has been used in a very loose sense so far in our story of epistemic dynamics. More elaborate formal accounts of learning mechanisms and their epistemic relevance are found in (Kelly 1996) and Hendricks (2002 Hendricks ( , 2005 . It is quite attractive to view learning theory as a natural continuation of dynamic-epistemic logic. It kicks in with long-term processes that require the larger arena of a branching temporal universe (van Benthem 2005A).
A real unification of the two approaches might make for a very powerful coalition! Group action and 'social' knowledge Epistemic logic has considered some notions of group knowledge, including not just common knowledge, but also 'distributed knowledge' which the group would have if agents pooled their information. But taking groups seriously as epistemic subjects in their own right would require a more sustained analysis of ways in which groups as plural subjects might be said to know
propositions. In particular, such notions would require a structured account of ways in which group members can communicate, i.e., the channels in the group (Barwise & Seligman 1995) . In parallel with this, one would also need an account of group action, perhaps beyond individual action -cf. the philosophical research on shared agency starting from Bratman 1993. There is some promising work on logics of powers of game-theoretic coalitions (Pauly 2001) , but that is only the beginning -and it does not include epistemic considerations. One measure of the complexity of the logic of collective knowledge and action is our own vocabulary in natural language. The way we describe what "we" or "they" do together, or to "each other" in terms of collective predication is complex (Landman 1989 , van der Does 1992 , and no simple reduction to indidivual actions seems to work. Some linguists have suggested that we need to think of linguistic plural subjects as distributed information systems that can act, but again, this just shows that the linguists do not have a ready-made answer for us either.
But fact remains that we do switch easily from individual to plural perspectives in both knowledge and action -and perhaps epistemology should take this more seriously.
Clerk Maxwell once quipped that, if a scientist says "We now think that such-and-such", this just means "All people who thought otherwise are dead". But surely, there is more to the cognitive plural than this! Now, epistemic logic has nothing decisive to offer here so far. But for the purpose of this paper, it is enough to see that, in this area as in the earlier ones, it finds itself in the same boat with mainstream epistemology.
Conclusions
I conclude with a few general thoughts raised by writing this paper.
Omissions This paper has looked at some developments in modern epistemic logic that seem to run in parallel with epistemology in general. Many further illustrations could have been given, and many further issues could have been raised to broaden the interface. I have ignored (another epistemic action well worth studying!) longer-term epistemic behavior over time, evolution of cognitive practices (Skyrms 1990 ), learning theory (Kelly 1996 , Hendricks 2002 , as well as connections with other technical disciplines than logic that are relevant to epistemology, such as probability theory or information theory. True, but this does not weaken the points about fruitful contacts. notions and arguments, a sort of notation entering into a creative interplay with its subject matter (I owe this wonderful point to Paul Egré). Indeed, this can take existing philosophical debates to new depths, witness the 'search-light function' of dynamicepistemic logic in probing the viability of verificationism, or to mention another field involved here, speech act theory. Even more ambitiously, logical systems also provide ways of developing new philosophical views, the way Carnap used them (Leitgeb 2004 ). This fits the idea in Smullyan 1997 of 'crazy philosophers', people using logical tools as a means of creating new worlds and phantasies: much cheaper, and much less dangerous than mind-blowing drugs. And if one still feels that logicians sacrifice too much with the simplifications needed for their systems, I will quote a leading Dutch thinker who once said: "Any fool can see that the world is rich, beautiful, and complex. But it takes a genius to make one good simplification".
Logic in philosophy
A view of knowledge
In the course of this paper, a certain view of knowledge has emerged which I did not have when I started. As observed earlier, many philosophical views of knowledge try to get at its robustness or stability. I share that intuition. But the more I think of it, the more I see the robustness of knowledge, not as an isolated feature of a single agents and single propositions. It is rather something which can only be explained in a setting of further epistemic attitudes, further epistemic agents, and a rich repertoire of epistemic actions. The robustness of knowledge lies in its successful functioning in a complex epistemic environment: the one we live in. And therefore, both logic and epistemology need to set their sights accordingly.
Bridges This volume is about bridges, even seven bridges in the original invitation. That is a metaphor. And a rich one. I could not help thinking of the 'Königsberger Brücken', which Euler used in graph theory, and where Kant must have walked:
Is logic one of the pieces of mainland here, to be connected by a bridge to the philosophical territory on the other side? Is it one of the bridges facilitating traffic between different fields: philosophy, linguistics, computer science? Or is logic the island?
I cannot say. But I do know that bridges illustrate the main concerns of this paper.
One must know where they are, they are made for dynamic actions of crossing, preferably by many agents, but groups should beware, and not march too much in step.
